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Abstract: 
 
This paper explores the interaction between the federal Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) and 
the cost-of-living faced by single mothers. After the 1993 EITC expansion, we identify up to a 
10 percentage point increase in labor force participation for single mothers in the lowest cost 
areas but no discernable response in the highest cost areas. We conclude that the EITC’s welfare-
enhancing properties are undermined by the interaction of the program’s fixed national rules and 
geographic variation in wages and cost-of-living. In addition, our findings suggest that the EITC 
does little to reduce joblessness in many of the nation’s largest cities.  
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” Among the 122 large cities…the average EITC (for all earners) in 2003 ranged from roughly 
$1,200 in Cambridge, MA, to $2,284 in McAllen, along the Texas-Mexico border.”  
 
“The New Safety Net: How the Tax Code Helped Low-Income Working Families During the Early 
2000s” (Berube, 2006) 
 
Introduction 
 
The federal Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is a wage subsidy available to lower-
income, working families.  Since its inception in 1975, major expansions in 1986, 1993, and 
2001 contributed to large increases in the size of the benefit and the number of potential 
beneficiaries.  By 2008, the EITC was worth up to $4,800 and families with earnings as high as 
$38,000 qualified for some credit.1  
Policymakers intend for the EITC to reward work by altering the labor supply incentives 
of the potentially eligible. Estimates of the effect of the EITC on labor supply consistently find 
large positive effects on the decision to work but no effect on the decision of how much to work.  
Previous studies, however, fail to adequately address the influence of geographic differences in 
both wages and the cost-of-living. Cost differences make the credit more (or less) valuable 
across geographic areas. With a nationally uniform benefit structure, the EITC is more valuable 
in a geographic area with a low cost-of-living relative to an area where the cost-of-living is high.  
In addition, the nationally uniform eligibility rules effectively treat equivalent workers 
differently across geographic areas because, although net wages may equalize across areas for 
specific worker-types, gross wages vary considerably.2 EITC eligibility based on gross income, 
therefore, results in variation in EITC benefits across geographic areas. In general, low-skilled 
workers in high-cost areas earn higher gross wages and are more likely to end up on the phase-
                                                 
1 A small credit for very low-income childless workers was added in 1993. 
2 Albouy (2008) – discussed further below – examines the broader issue of the economic consequences of a 
nationally uniform federal income tax code in the face of regional differences in wages and cost-of-living.   
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out portion of the EITC schedule or off the schedule completely than similar workers in low-cost 
areas. For example, a single mother working full-time as a janitor in a high-cost city (Cambridge, 
MA) may have earnings that place her on the phase-out portion of the credit. In contrast, with a 
lower wage in a low-cost city (McAllen, TX), her annual earnings would place her on the phase-
in portion. The single mother in this example would earn different credit amounts depending on 
whether she lived in the high-cost city or the low-cost city. 
Local costs are critical to analyzing the EITC because earnings and the bundle of goods 
and service available for purchase with earnings are realized in specific local labor markets. We 
address differences across geographic areas by including a measure of location-specific prices – 
housing costs of the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) – to examine heterogeneous effects of 
the EITC across geographic areas. Using the 1993 EITC expansion, we find that the effect of the 
EITC on labor supply depends on the housing costs in the worker’s local labor market. The EITC 
contributed to an approximately 10 percentage point increase in the participation of single 
women in the lowest-cost areas. We find no evidence of a participation effect for single women 
in the highest-cost metropolitan areas, where nearly 40 percent of the population lives. We find 
some evidence of differences in the hours of work decision across cost areas, but these results are 
not robust to the selection of our sample or to the choice of our reform period. 
This paper proceeds as follows: Section II discusses how the EITC affects labor supply 
decisions, the theory behind wage differences across local areas, and the relevant literature on the 
EITC. Section III provides our data and methodology. Section IV provides our estimates for 
participation and hours worked decision. Section V discusses the implications of the findings, 
and Section VI concludes. 
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Section II: Theory and Literature 
The EITC and Labor Supply 
The structure of the EITC (displayed in Figure 1) includes a “phase-in,” “plateau,” and 
“phase-out” region. Earnings in the phase-in region receive a constant rate subsidy, up to the 
maximum credit. Earnings in the plateau region receive the maximum credit. Once earnings 
reach the phase-out region the credit decreases at a constant rate for each additional dollar of 
earned income until the credit is completely eliminated.  
< Figure 1 approximately here> 
In the standard static model of labor supply, the EITC shifts out the budget constraint and 
provides unambiguously positive incentives on labor force participation.3  However, this shifted 
budget constraint also creates EITC-induced kinks. As a result, the impact of the EITC on hours 
worked is ambiguous owing to negative income effects (assuming leisure is normal good) over 
the entire schedule but substitution effects that vary across the regions of the credit.  
The phase-in region contains positive substitution effects that encourage additional hours 
of work by increasing the hourly return to work; no substitution effect exists in the plateau 
region; a negative substitution effect in the phase-out region reduces the hourly return to work. 
As a result, the net effect varies across regions: in the phase-in region, the net effect is 
theoretically ambiguous while in the plateau and phase-out regions the net effect is 
unambiguously negative.4 Thus, the overall effect of the EITC on hours becomes an empirical 
                                                 
3 This is the case for single women. Married couples eligible for the EITC face more complex participation 
decisions. 
4 For incomes greater than the phase-out region, the EITC may induce a taxpayer to reduce her hours to receive a 
credit. 
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question which depends on the distribution of beneficiaries across the schedule and the relative 
magnitudes of the income and substitution effects. 
Regional Differences in the Cost-of-living 
The EITC is expected to have different impacts on labor supply across MSAs due to 
variation in the cost-of-living, particularly the considerable geographic variation in housing 
costs. The causes and consequences of this geographic variation have been the subject of 
considerable interest, both in the economics literature and in policy debates.5 In fact, a National 
Academy of Science (NAS) commissioned study recommended that the federal poverty 
threshold be adjusted to reflect differences in housing costs and other prices across geographic 
areas (Citro and Michael, 1995).6 The NAS study showed that wages were higher in areas with a 
high cost-of-living.  
We find empirical support for this relationship between wages and the cost-of-living. We 
use 1990 quality-adjusted annual rental cost data provided by Chen and Rosenthal (2008) to 
measure the cost-of-living.7 Using the Current Population Survey (CPS) Outgoing Rotation 
Group data for 1990-1995, we estimate average hourly wages of single, female household heads 
ages 18 to 49 by deciles of the MSA quality-adjusted housing costs. In Table 1, we show 
estimates for selected industry and occupations that employ the greatest numbers of single 
                                                 
5 See Rosen (1979), Roback (1988), and Hoynes (2000).  
6 These recommendations to adjust the poverty threshold to differences in housing costs or other price differences 
across geographic areas were not ultimately adopted due to a variety of reasons, including measurement problems, 
lack of data, and political constraints. The NAS did conclude, however, that “the available data suggest that areas 
with higher prices are also areas with higher income levels: for example, a cost-of-housing index that we calculated 
for states correlates highly with state median family income.” (Citro and Michael, 1995; 184) 
7 Chen and Rosenthal construct their measure by estimating a hedonic regression controlling for structural 
characteristics of housing units in each MSA from the 1990 Census. From these estimates, Chen and Rosenthal 
report housing costs for each MSA relative to the mean, ranging from $3,785 below the mean to $6,152 above the 
mean. For ease in interpretation, we transform Chen and Rosenthal’s measure into a positive value for all MSAs by 
adding $4,000 to each value. The new range of quality adjusted rent, which we refer to as our rental costs, is $215 to 
$10,152. 
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women. Wages for nursing aids was $5.51 in the lowest-cost decile and $8.32 in the highest 
decile; average wages in eating and drinking establishments were $4.12 in the lowest decile and 
$5.54 in the highest. After controlling for demographic and labor market characteristics, a 
regression of hourly wages on average rent yields a coefficient of 0.00031, suggesting $1,000 in 
higher quality-adjusted annual rents is associated with $.31 higher hourly wages (which 
translates to $645 in annual earnings for full-time, full-year workers). Separate regressions by 
occupation and industry groups (included in Table 1) yield similar results.  
< Table 1 approximately here > 
This relationship between local prices on wages is established in several models, 
including those by Roback (1988), who extends the classic Rosen-Roback hedonic model to 
include heterogeneous labor inputs, and more recently by Black, et al. (2007).8 With two skill-
types and variation across cities in amenities, both of these models show that if low-skilled types 
have a lower willingness to pay for amenities – whether or not the amenity is productive – the 
low-skilled must receive a higher wage in a high-amenity city to have the same utility level 
across cities.9 The willingness of high-skill types to pay for the amenity raises rent in the high-
amenity cities, and higher rent must be offset through higher wages if low-skill types are also to 
reside in high-amenity cities. Equilibrium sorting implies that wages, and therefore incomes, will 
differ across cities for the same skill types and that low-skill types will have higher wages in 
high-cost regions.  
 
                                                 
8 Black et. al. are specifically concerned with the variation in the returns to education, contrasting earnings of 
college graduates with high school graduates, but the logic of the model applies to wages as well.  
9 An additional assumption is that the different labor inputs are not perfect substitutes. 
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The EITC, Labor Supply, and Cost-of-living 
Geographic variation in wages implies that low-skilled workers will face different EITC 
treatment based on where they live. To show this empirically, in the period before the EITC 
expansion of 1993, we examine the incomes of employed single women relative to the EITC 
schedule for different MSAs in Table 2. 10 The top panel of Table 2 contains estimates for all 
single women while the bottom panel displays estimates for single women with a high school 
degree or less. In the early 1990s, 12.6 percent of single females in MSAs in the lowest quarter 
of the rental cost distribution have incomes too high to be on the EITC schedule compared to 
32.1 percent in the top quarter of MSAs. For low-educated women, the figures are 6.3 percent 
and 18.3 percent, respectively. In addition, eligible workers in low-cost areas are more likely to 
fall in the phase-in and plateau regions of the credit, where the benefit is larger. 
< Table 2 approximately here> 
We can unambiguously predict that an expansion of the EITC will have a greater impact 
on labor force participation in low-cost areas than in high-cost areas for three reasons. The first 
two of these reasons follow directly from our estimates in Table 2. Workers in low-cost areas 
have lower wages. These lower wages result in annual incomes that are more likely to make 
these workers income-eligible for the EITC.  Secondly, once income-eligible for the credit, 
workers in low-cost areas are more likely to receive larger benefits because their incomes are 
more likely to place them on the phase-in or plateau region rather than the phase-out region. 
Finally, related to the variation that exists in wages, geographic variation also exists in housing 
prices. As a result, any given nominal benefit will have different purchasing power across 
metropolitan areas. EITC benefits to a worker in a low-cost area have greater purchasing power – 
                                                 
10 We measure adjusted gross from the prior year income information in the March CPS for 1990 to 1993.  
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and, thus, these benefits are a greater real incentive – than the same nominal benefit to a worker 
in a high-cost area. 
It is less clear how variation in MSA costs will affect the decision of how many hours to 
work because of offsetting income and substitution effects. With a larger share of low-skilled 
workers directly impacted by the EITC, hours in low-cost areas should be more responsive 
overall to the policy change. And with a larger share of workers located in the phase-in region of 
the credit, low-cost areas should be more likely to have positive responses on the hours of work 
decision. At the same time, however, the income effect should be greater in low-cost areas 
because the nominal benefit has greater purchasing power. Ultimately, the mix of incentives 
faced by workers on different portions of the credit makes it difficult to make strong predictions 
about responses in hours of work to the EITC. In short, we expect the hours worked decision to 
be less responsive to the cost-of-living than the participation decision. 
Previous EITC Literature  
A large literature studying the labor supply response to the EITC, fully reviewed in Hotz 
and Scholz (2003) and Eissa and Hoynes (2006), emerged after the pioneering work of Eissa and 
Liebman (1996). Eissa and Liebman examine the EITC expansion in the Tax Reform Act of 
1986 (TRA86) with a difference-in-difference analysis. Because only families with children 
could receive the credit, Eissa and Liebman use single mothers as the treatment group and single, 
childless women as the control group. They find that the 1986 expansion of the EITC increased 
the labor force participation of single mothers by 2.8 percentage points relative to single women 
without children. Depending on their specification, they estimate no change or a small, positive 
change in the hours worked of single mothers relative to single women without children. 
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The findings of Eissa and Liebman’s difference-in-difference approach are largely 
consistent with other approaches. A large increase in participation is found using a variety of 
econometric methodologies, samples, and expansion periods: a panel dataset of California 
welfare recipients (Hotz, et al., 2006); models including welfare use (Grogger, 2003); simulation 
studies (Dickert, et al., 1995; Scholz, 1996); and structural modeling with extensive controls for 
all tax and benefit changes over the 1984 to 1996 period (Meyer and Rosenbaum, 2001). In 
contrast, almost no study finds a substantial change in the hours worked of recipients.11 Eissa 
and Liebman (1996) and Eissa and Hoynes (2006) posit a number of reasons for the inability of 
the EITC to influence the hours worked by a recipient: labor market norms and institutions 
which allow for only part-time or full time work, measurement error, and a lack of knowledge 
about the exact structure of the EITC.   
                                                
To our knowledge, no examination of the labor supply response to the EITC rigorously 
considers cost-of-living differences across geographic areas. Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001) 
control for the state cost-of-living in their structural model, but they do not report estimates for 
this variable, nor do they interact it with their tax change variable. Other EITC work that 
examines geographic variation focuses on take-up of the credit and suggests that urban areas 
have lower utilization rates than other areas (Maynard and Dollins, 2002; Berube and Tiffany, 
2004; Hirasuna and Stinson, 2004). In short, few analyses consider geographical differences in 
the EITC despite differences in participation and average credit size across state and 
metropolitan areas, and the discussion by advocates for the working poor of the variation in 
average credit amounts across metropolitan areas (Berube, 2006). 
 
11 The one exception we are aware of is Wu (2005), which shows different effects on the phase-in and phase-out 
regions of the EITC schedule, which cancel out to produce no overall effect on hours.  
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Section III: Methodology and Data Sources 
Estimation Strategy 
We consider the EITC expansion included in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 
1993 (OBRA93), which increased the maximum credit, extended EITC eligibility to those with 
higher incomes, and created a small credit for childless workers. These EITC increases were 
implemented in steps from 1994 through 1996 by adjusting five credit parameters, details of 
which are contained in Table 3. Potential recipients faced more generous benefits in 1994, 1995, 
and 1996 as a result of OBRA93.  
< Table 3 approximately here > 
We use the familiar difference-in-difference estimator to measure how an affected group 
(low-educated, single mothers) changes its labor supply relative to an unaffected group (low-
educated, single women without children). We choose this sample for several reasons. Low-
educated workers are more likely to have earnings in the credit range; single parents are the 
largest group of workers eligible for the EITC; women almost always head single parent 
families, and; unmarried individuals allow us to avoid intra-household bargaining decisions that 
affect married individuals. While OBRA93 extended EITC eligibility to those without children, 
the credit is quite small and available only to those extremely low incomes. Our identifying 
variation comes from group differences in tax schedules faced by single mothers and single 
women without children. For identification, we require that differential trends in labor force 
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participation and hours of work do not exist between single mothers and single women without 
children.12  
Unlike previous work, we allow for heterogeneous effects across local areas by 
interacting our cost-of-living measure by the difference-in-difference estimator. Our coefficient 
of interest is the heterogeneous effect of the EITC across metropolitan areas. This is not the 
standard triple-difference estimator because the addition of the cost-of-living variable does not 
provide us an additional control group. Instead, it allows us to explore differential responses 
across areas. 
Data 
The data we use are from the 1990 through 1995 monthly CPS.13 The CPS is a monthly 
survey of approximately 50,000 households which provides current demographic, labor market, 
geographic, and income information for responding households.  We construct tax units from the 
sample by matching children age 18 and under, as well as full-time students age 19 to 24, to their 
mothers. We limit our sample to single (never married, widowed, or divorced) women who are 
heads of tax units, ages 16 to 49. In our main results, we further limit our sample to those with a 
high school degree or less. We drop the self-employed, as well as unpaid agriculture workers, 
and those with negative unearned income. We drop from the sample those who report attending 
school full-time and those who report an illness or disability that prohibits work.  
                                                 
12 Later we do explore the robustness of our findings using single women with more than one child as our treatment 
group and single women with only one child as the control group.  
13 We do not include summer months (June, July, and August) in our data because the geographical variables are not 
available in June, July, or August 1995 as a result of the CPS redesign. We do not include data from 1996 because of 
the work mandates that were associated with welfare reform legislation in 1996. 
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For each tax unit, we merge on unemployment rates in each MSA and an MSA cost-of-
living measure.14 For those tax units residing outside of an MSA, we merge on the state’s non-
MSA value for unemployment rates and cost-of-living. Our cost-of-living measure is the 1990 
quality-adjusted housing costs provided by Chen and Rosenthal (2008). Chen and Rosenthal 
construct their cost measure by estimating a hedonic regression controlling for structural 
characteristics of housing units in each MSA and state non-MSA from the 1990 Census. From 
these estimates, Chen and Rosenthal report housing costs for each MSA and non-MSA relative 
to the mean, ranging from $3,785 below the mean to $6,152 above the mean. For ease in 
interpretation, we transform Chen and Rosenthal’s measure into a positive value for all MSAs by 
adding $4,000 to each value. The new range of quality-adjusted rent, which we refer to as our 
rental costs, is $215 to $10,152.15  Our use of geographic variation forces us to drop observations 
without a basic geographic identifier (MSA or state non-MSA) because we cannot assign 
unemployment rates or rental costs. 
Table 4 presents summary statistics of the characteristics of our full sample, as well as 
our treatment and control groups in Columns 1 through 3 and across cost-of-living areas in 
Columns 4 through 7. Overall, our sample of childless women is more likely to have received a 
high school degree than our sample of single mothers. Single mothers are more likely to be 
nonwhite and live in MSAs with slightly lower average rental costs. Single mothers have much 
lower levels of labor force participation but, conditional upon working, their earnings, hours of 
work and unemployment rates are similar. 
< Table 4 approximately here > 
                                                 
14 Details on the creation of MSAs that are consistent over the 1990 to 1995 period are included in Appendix A. 
15 The full listing of MSA and state non-MSA rental costs is available from the authors. 
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Looking across metropolitan areas, higher-cost areas have more single women who have 
received their high school degree. The highest-cost areas are much more likely to have 
implemented a waiver to the state’s Aid to Family with Dependent Children (AFDC) program.  
Despite the work mandates associated with welfare waivers, the highest-cost areas have lower 
levels of labor force participation. Conditional upon working, the difference in wages across 
local areas is nearly two dollars: hourly earners in the lowest quarter have average hourly wages 
of $5.99 while average hourly wages are $7.76 in the highest quarter. Similarly, conditional upon 
working, average weekly earnings are $70 higher in the highest quarter than in the lowest. 
Other than differences in wages and earnings across areas, women in different quarters of 
the rental cost distribution appear roughly comparable in the number of children they have. 
Conditional on having any children, the number of children a woman has is not associated with 
the cost-of-living. Mothers in the lowest quarter of rental costs have, on average, 1.81 children. 
In the highest quarter of rental costs, mothers have on average 1.87 children. With these small 
differences, we expect that mothers in different areas would not qualify for different EITC 
benefits based solely on their demographic characteristics. Differences in EITC eligibility arise 
from differences in incomes. 
Section IV: Results 
Participation Estimates 
We estimate how the effect of the EITC on labor force participation differs across local areas 
with the probit equation: 
(1) Pr(LFP = 1) = Φ (α + βΖ + γ0 treatment + γ1 post + γ2 (treatment*post)   
+ γ3 (treatment*post*cost) + γ4 cost)  
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Our dependent variable, LFP, is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the respondent reported 
working last week and 0 if not. The difference-in-difference estimator, γ2, measures how low-
educated, single mothers change their labor force participation relative to low-educated, single 
women without children after 1993.16 Our main coefficient of interest, γ3, measures the 
heterogeneous effect of the EITC across local areas. Our independent variables (Z) control for 
observable differences between our treatment and control groups, as well as covariates 
associated with labor force participation. These include age, age squared, number of preschool 
age children, number of dependents,17 the number of dependents squared, an indicator for more 
than one child, race, MSA unemployment rate, and educational attainment. We also control for 
the month of implementation of AFDC policy waivers. Standard errors are clustered at the MSA 
level. All reported estimates from the participation equations are the mean marginal effects.18 
We present estimates of the mean marginal effects from our probit regressions in Table 5. 
We first estimate the effect of the EITC on labor market participation similar to prior work. We 
find that low-educated single mothers increased their employment rate by 4.7 percentage points 
relative to low-educated single women without children as a result of the 1993 expansion, in 
Column 1 of Table 5. This estimate is larger than the roughly three percent participation increase 
estimated by Meyer (2002) and Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001) for the 1993 expansion. Both 
studies, however, do not limit their sample by education. When we expand the sample to include 
                                                 
16 Technically the interaction terms in a probit model are not straightforward to interpret. The coefficient on the 
interaction terms does not simply capture the marginal effect, but also includes additional terms that are conditional 
on the interacted variables as well as any other independent variables. We also performed Linear Probability Models 
(LPM) in addition to probit models. Our LPM results (not reported here) are similar to our probit results. We chose 
to report results from probit regressions for ease of comparison with other estimates in the literature. We also used 
the inteff procedure, described in Ai, et al. (2004), to obtain correct marginal effects (and standard errors) for the 
difference-in-difference variable in the probit equation. These results were nearly identical to the results obtained 
from calculating the mean marginal probit effects via Gelbach’s (2004) margfx procedure, as well as results from 
LPM models. All are available upon request. 
17 We defined a dependent as a child under the age of 18 or between the ages of 18 and 24 and in school full time. 
18 We employed the margfx command to calculate the mean of the marginal effects, as opposed to calculating the 
marginal effect evaluated at the mean (Gelbach, 2004). 
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all levels of education, in Column 4, our estimates are nearly identical. Controls for education, 
age, race, and the local unemployment rate have the expected sign. 
< Table 5 approximately here > 
We explore whether the EITC participation effect differs systematically by local areas in 
Column 2.  We begin by creating dichotomous variables for MSA in cost quarters, based on the 
distribution of quality-adjusted rental costs, omitting the first cost quarter. Interacting these 
dichotomous variables with the difference-in-difference variable demonstrates that the lowest 
cost quarter has a 7.3 percentage point increase in labor force participation. The estimate for the 
second cost quarter implies that the increase in these areas is 2.3 percentage points more than the 
lowest cost quarter, although the point estimate is insignificant. The third cost quarter implies a 
slightly lower response than the first cost quarter, although again it is insignificant. The estimate 
for the highest cost quarter is almost equal in magnitude and opposite in sign to the lowest cost 
quarter. In sum, the increase in labor force participation in the bottom three quarters of rental 
costs is 7.3 percentage points while the highest quarter of rental costs shows no response on 
participation.  
To take advantage of the full variation in costs we interact the difference-in-difference 
estimator with our continuous measure of rental costs in Column 3. The difference-in-difference 
estimator rises to 10.2 percentage points. However, each $1,000 increase in our quality-adjusted 
rental costs reduces participation by one percentage point. These results again suggest no effect 
of the EITC on participation in the highest-cost areas.  
< Table 6 approximately here > 
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The local cost-of-living may systematically impact all covariates associated with labor 
force participation, such as the cost of child care, conditions in the local labor market, and 
returns to education. The summary statistics in Table 4 demonstrates some differences in the 
observable characteristics of individuals in each metropolitan area in education and race. 
Additionally, the implementation of an AFDC waiver is positively correlated with high-cost 
MSAs, suggesting that states that implemented a waiver tend to contain high-cost MSAs. Using 
the distribution of rental costs, we split the sample of low-educated women into quarters by cost-
of-living. We further split the highest rent quarter in half (75th to 87th percentile and 88th 
percentile and above) to determine if differences in MSAs at the upper tail of the distribution 
drove the lack of a participation effect found in Column 3 in the most expensive areas.  We test 
to determine if we should pool these cost-of-living areas or estimate each area separately. A 
Wald test strongly rejects pooling (p=0.000). 
We rerun our participation equation separately for each of these cost-of-living areas and 
report the results in Table 6. Overall, the EITC expansion effect is larger in the lower-cost areas 
than the higher-cost areas. The second (Column 2) and third (Column 3) quarter of costs have the 
largest and most significant effects: an increase in employment of 6.3 and 7.0 percentage points, 
respectively. Meanwhile, the first quarter (Column 1) has a slightly smaller response, with a rise 
in participation of 4.7 percentage points. Above the 75th percentile of rent (Columns 4 and 5), the 
EITC has no significant effect on participation. 
We test whether each of these point estimates are significantly different from each other. 
We cannot conclude that the estimates in the first three quarters (Columns 1 through 3 of Table 
6) are different from one another at the 10 percent significance level. However, virtually all of 
the point estimates in the first three quarters are significantly different at the 10 percent 
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significance level from the point estimates from the 75th to 87th percentile (Column 4), as well as 
the point estimate from MSAs above the 87th percentile (Column 5). The one exception to these 
findings is that we cannot conclude that the point estimate from the lowest quarter of MSAs 
(Column 1) is statistically different from the point estimate from MSAs above the 87th percentile. 
The p-value from this Chi-Squared test is 0.24. 
Robustness Checks 
We perform several tests to explore whether our results are dependent on our 
methodological considerations, and if the identifying assumptions of the difference-in-difference 
estimator are valid. First, we expand our sample to all women, regardless of education level for 
each specification. The difference-in-difference, not including our cost-of-living variable, falls 
from 4.7 to 3.1 percentage points (Column 4 of Table 5). When we include the heterogeneous 
effects using dichotomous variables for each cost quarter in Column 5, our heterogeneous effect 
shows the same pattern as our baseline estimates but with smaller magnitudes. Participation 
increased by 4.3 percentage points in the lowest quarter, 7.1 points in the second quarter, and 4.3 
percentage points in the third quarter. Again, there was no change in participation in the highest 
rent quarter. Results using the continuous cost-of-living measure (Column 6 of Table 5) imply 
that areas with the very highest costs (roughly above the 85th percentile) actually had a reduction 
in employment of single mothers relative to single, childless women as a result of the EITC. 
When we split all single women, regardless of education, into quarters of the rental cost 
distribution and further split the top quarter in half, the same pattern of results is again apparent 
in Columns 6 through 10 of Table 6. The largest response is in the second quarter of costs 
(Column 7) with an almost 6 percentage point increase in labor force participation. The lowest 
quarter (Column 6) and third quarter (Column 8) display a similar response of roughly 3 
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percentage points. Unlike our sample of low-educated women, women in MSAs in the 75th to 
87th percentile of the rental cost distribution also show a labor force participation response of 3 
percentage points (Column 9). In MSAs above the 87th percentile (Column 10), there is no 
response in labor force participation.  
Next, we check the robustness of our cost measures with two different measures of 
housing costs: Housing and Urban Development (HUD) Fair Market Rent data from 1990 and 
median rent data from the 1990 Census.19 Both measures suggest the same magnitude and 
pattern of results as our quality-adjusted rental cost data.20 (The distribution of these two 
alternative housing cost measures, compared with our positive quality-adjusted measure is 
included in Appendix B.) 
Finally, we test the validity of the identifying assumption in the difference-in-difference 
estimator – that the policy change under consideration is the only group and time-varying factor 
(outside of the additional covariates) impacting the dependent variable is valid – in several ways. 
First, we conduct a placebo test by running the same regressions from equation 1 during years 
when there was no policy change. If the change in the EITC is causing single mothers to increase 
their labor force participation, we shouldn’t see a change in labor force participation in years 
when the policy is not changing. We limit the sample to observations in 1990 and 1991, treating 
1990 as our “pre” period and 1991 as our “post” period (Columns 1 and 2 of Table 7).21 The 
                                                 
19 The HUD fair market rent data provides estimates the price for a two-bedroom unit from a series of separate 
regional surveys. The Census median rent data includes all types of rental housing, regardless of the number of 
rooms. Thus, the Census data may introduce variation in the median rent arising from the mix of types within the 
rental market while the HUD data controls for the rental size and, to some extent, the quality of the rental housing 
stock. 
20 These results are not included, but are available on request. 
21 Because of annual inflation-based adjustments, there are small changes to some EITC parameters every year 
during this period and since. Between 1990 and 1991 there were some additional changes in phase-in and phase-out 
rates from OBRA90, but these changes were relatively small, especially compared to those contained in OBRA93 
(Table 3 and Figure 1.) 
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difference-in-difference estimates, as well as the heterogeneous effects, from the placebo tests 
are small and insignificant. In contrast, limiting the sample to 1993 and 1994 we continue to find 
large and significant results for our variables of interest (Columns 3 and 4 of Table 7). 
As an additional robustness check we explore the differential response of families with 
two or more children compared to those with only one child. Changes to the EITC in the mid-
1990s affected both types of families, but the changes were much larger for families with two or 
more kids. Between 1993 and 1995, the maximum EITC benefit rose 46 percent for one-child 
families, but it more than doubled for families with two or more kids, going up by 106 percent. 
Ceteris paribus we expect that larger families will experience greater changes in labor force 
participation than one-child families. In fact, results from specification (1) using families with 
two or more kids as the treatment group and families with only one child as the control group do 
suggest larger responses. Interacting the DD estimator with cost-of-living measures (similar to 
columns 2 and 3 in Table 5) show increases in labor force participation between 3.6 and 3.0, 
depending on the specification, but the results narrowly miss significance at standard levels.22 
Limiting our sample size in this way (excluding childless women reduces the sample by more 
than half) reduces the precision of the estimates, and makes it impossible to re-create the separate 
DD results by cost group as in Table 7.  
Finally, we explore whether the expansion of state-level EITC policies adopted in the 
mid-1990s could be driving the geographic patterns in labor supply response we observe.23 (We 
are already controlling for the adoption of welfare-reform waivers which vary across states and 
                                                 
22 For the specification interacting the difference in difference coefficient with quarter of the cost-of-living 
distribution, p=.18. Expanding the sample to bring in single mothers with some college, but no degree, increases the 
sample size from 24,973 to 36,038, and improves the precision of the results – the standard error falls from .027 to 
.020 – with only a small impact on the coefficient. These results are available on request. 
23 Data on state EITC policies is from Leigh (2007) Table 2. 
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impact the labor force participation of single mothers.)  To test the impact of these policies, we 
run additional regressions including a variable to reflect refundable state-level EITCs. Whether 
the state policies are coded as a simple dummy variable, the state credit rate, or the maximum 
dollar amount of the state EITC, our coefficients of interest are unaffected.24  
Hours Results 
While participation varies by cost-of-living, as we predicted, we do not have a clear 
prediction about a change in hours of work arising from the EITC in different MSAs. To 
estimate the effect on hours worked for those working, we again adopt a difference-in-difference 
strategy. We use the same covariates as in our participation equation but our dependent variable 
is hours worked last week. Our equation is: 
(2) Hours = α + βΖ + γ0 treatment + γ1 post + γ2 (treatment*post)   
+ γ3 (treatment*post*cost) + γ4 cost  
 
We drop women who did not report working last week. Our independent variables (Z) are 
identical to those in the participation equation and include age, age squared, number of 
preschool-age children, number of dependents, the number of dependents squared, an indicator 
for more than one child, race, MSA unemployment rate, educational attainment, and the month 
of implementation of welfare policy waivers. Standard errors are clustered at the MSA level.  
We begin with the standard difference-in-difference strategy seen in the literature for our 
sample of low-educated single women. Like other work, we find no effect of the EITC on the 
hours worked per week in column 1 of Table 8. However, when we look at heterogeneous effects 
                                                 
24 These results are not included, but are available on request. The coefficients on the state EITC covariates are 
uniformly negative, suggesting that states with refundable EITC policies in the mid-1990s were those with lower 
rates of female labor force participation.  
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in each cost quarter (column 2) of the distribution of housing costs with the lowest-cost quarter 
serving as the omitted group, we do begin to find significant responses in the lowest and highest-
cost quarters. In the lowest-cost quarter, single mothers increased their hours of work by 1.3 
hours per week, relative to single women without children. In the highest-cost quarter, single 
mothers reduced their hours of work by 0.6 hours per week, relative to single women without 
children.  
< Table 8 approximately here > 
These results demonstrate that in different MSAs women may be facing different 
incentives from the EITC. As in our earlier example of janitors in different cities, working single 
mothers in the lower-cost areas are more likely to have annual earnings that place them in the 
phase-in portion of the credit. The estimates suggest that in the lowest-cost areas the substitution 
effect outweighs any negative income effect created by the credit structure. In contrast, a 
working single mother in the highest-cost areas is more likely to face the high marginal tax rates 
arising from the phase-out of the credit. In these areas, the substitution and income effects work 
in concert, reducing the labor supply of working single mothers. 
In Column 3, we use a continuous measure of housing costs interacted with the 
difference-in-difference estimator. The difference-in-difference estimator rises to an increase in 
weekly hours of 1.7 hours. However, each $1,000 increase in our quality adjusted rental costs 
reduces weekly hours by 0.4. Thus, the very highest rental cost areas behaved differently than 
other areas. Single mothers living in MSAs at or above the 85th percentile of costs reduce their 
hours of work in response to the EITC. 
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As in our participation estimates, we again divide the sample into four quarters based on 
the rental cost distribution and divide the highest quarter in half. We report the estimates from 
these regressions in Columns 1 through 5 of Table 9. Our results are less robust when we run 
sub-samples separately, possibly because of the small sample sizes for each estimate. However, 
we find the same pattern of results: our difference-in-difference estimates changes from a 
positive signed coefficients in Columns 1 through 3 to negative signed coefficients in Columns 4 
and 5 when the subsample changes from below the 75th percentile and subsamples above the 75th 
percentile.  
< Table 9 approximately here > 
Although the coefficients seem small, the labor supply responses at the lower tail of the 
cost-of-living distribution are not trivial. For a full-time single mother in a low-cost area working 
full-year, our estimates suggest that there was an increase of 68 to 86 hours of work per year. In 
a high-cost area, single mothers may have reduced their annual hours of work between 20 to 30 
hours. Additionally, our results demonstrate the need for estimating the effect in the local labor 
market in understanding the labor supply response to the EITC. The effect of the EITC on the 
intensive margin is dependent on the local wages facing potential recipients. 
Robustness Checks 
We check the robustness of the hours worked results to ensure our results are not driven 
by our methodology and that the indentifying assumptions are valid. Overall, the hours worked 
estimates are less robust than our participation estimates. Expanding our sample to include all 
employed single women, regardless of education level, provides estimates that are smaller and 
less significant in Columns 4 through 6 of Table 8 and Columns 6 through 10 of Table 9. This 
21 
 
suggests that our findings of the hours response in the directions predicted are a result of 
selecting our sample on the low-educated. We also consider the performance of the regressions 
using alternative measures of housing costs. The results do not change when using either the 
HUD Fair Market Rent or the median rental data from the 1990 Census. 
We test the identifying assumption of the difference-in-difference estimator by 
performing placebo tests. As in our participation results, we create two sub-samples 1990-1991 
and 1993-1994 where the first year in each is our “pre” period and the second period is the 
“post” period. In this case, our 1990-1991 subsample and our 1993-1994 subsample each have 
small and insignificant results. These tests also suggest that our results are not robust. 
We also estimate our equation with a Heckman selection model to correct for selecting 
our sample on those working last week.25 The results from Heckman models (Table 10) provide 
still weaker support for the influence of cost-of-living on the impact of the EITC on hours 
worked. Columns 1 through 3 include second stage results of the Heckman model for low-
educated women. The simple difference-in-difference (Column 1) is small and not significant. 
The regression including an interaction between the difference-in-difference and quarters of the 
rent distribution, however, does show a positive (though not significant) effect on hours worked 
in the lowest quarter of the rent distribution (0.2 hours per week), and a negative and significant 
(nearly one hour per week) effect in the highest-cost quarter. The interaction between the DD 
variable and a continuous measure of rent (Column 3) and the separate regressions by cost group 
(Columns 4 through 8) all have signs suggesting the same pattern of positive impacts on hours in 
                                                 
25 The second stage of the Heckman model excludes the following variables that were included in the previous 
equations: the number of children under 18, the number of children under 18 squared, and an indicator for the 
presence of a second child. 
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lower-cost regions and negative impacts in higher-cost areas. None of these coefficients, 
however, are significant.  
< Table 10 approximately here > 
The lack of robustness to our hours worked results is not surprising. Almost no study has 
found robust effects on the hours of work decision. This could be either because of measurement 
error, the lack of continuous hours of work choices for low-income workers, or lack of 
knowledge by recipients as to how the number of hours worked translates into EITC eligibility. 
While we find that there is some hours worked response in our sample of low-educated single 
women, our precision is limited by our small sample sizes of in each MSA. 
Section V: Discussion  
Our results suggest that the EITC has had little impact on the labor supply of low-income 
single mothers in the highest cost-of-living areas such as Boston, New York City, Los Angeles, 
and San Francisco. Although the EITC is an important transfer to low-income workers in high-
cost areas, the incentive is apparently insufficient to induce non-working single mothers in those 
areas to work rather than rely on the social safety net. This result is potentially a source of 
concern for two reasons. First, although the high-cost areas where the EITC produces no labor 
supply response account for 13 to 25 percent of MSAs, they represent as much as 40 percent of 
the total population. Second, these high-cost areas include many of the large metropolitan 
regions that are widely believed to have serious problems with poverty and joblessness. Whether 
the size of the credit is insufficient to overcome the fixed costs of work in higher cost-of-living 
areas, or the nationally fixed eligibility rules are incompatible with the local wage structure, or 
23 
 
some other reason, the EITC seems to be unsuccessful at changing the labor market decisions of 
low-skilled non-workers in these areas. 
Our findings also raise concerns regarding the welfare and efficiency impacts of the 
EITC. Since its inception one argument in support of the EITC has been its efficiency-enhancing 
properties. By offsetting relatively high taxes on the labor of low-paid workers and the steep 
marginal tax rates faced by those contemplating leaving public assistance, it reduces distortions 
in behavior (Ventry, 2001 and Hoffman and Seidman, 1990). Indeed, recent work by Eissa et al. 
(2008) finds that the EITC has improved welfare. Eissa et al. study a series of EITC reforms, 
including the reform contained in OBRA93, and evaluate welfare gains by contrasting the EITC, 
taking into account the interactions with other tax and transfer programs, to a lump-sum benefit. 
The ultimate welfare gains of the EITC result from welfare improvements along with extensive 
margin outweighing welfare losses along the intensive margin and those caused by the use of 
distortionary taxes to finance the benefit. 26 
While the welfare improvements of the EITC depend on responses along the extensive 
margin, our findings suggest that there is no such response in high-cost areas. Moreover, 
employed single mothers in high-cost areas may have reduced their hours of work in response to 
the policy. In sum, our findings of no change in participation and possibly fewer hours worked 
for those working imply welfare losses in high-cost areas. In low-cost areas, however, large 
increases in employment, and possible increases in hours worked, may have produced even 
                                                 
26 Eissa, et al. (2008) show that calculating the welfare gains of the EITC depend on correctly measuring labor 
supply responses on both the intensive and extensive margins. The response along each margin is related to a 
different tax wedge, and impacts welfare in opposite directions. As the EITC lowers the average tax rate, 
employment increases, which generates a host of positive public budget externalities and increases welfare. The 
change in marginal tax rates, which influence the intensive margin, varies across the schedule. Overall, changes in 
the intensive margin are found to be welfare decreasing, as hours of work reductions (and related negative public 
budget externalities) along the phase-out region swamp increases along with phase-in region.  
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larger welfare improvements than those suggested by Eissa et al. (2008). If a large portion of the 
country experiences welfare losses because the program rules and benefits are not compatible 
with the local labor market, there would appear to be considerable room for improvement. 
The imbalance in the value of the EITC between low- and high-cost regions may cause 
additional welfare losses, not considered by Eissa et al. (2008), by creating incentives for low-
skilled workers to relocate from high-cost to low-cost metropolitan areas. Under a spatial 
equilibrium with geographic differences in the cost-of-living, gross wages will vary across areas 
for given worker types. Their real wages, however, should be equal. A major reform to the EITC, 
which is based on gross wages, will disturb that equilibrium and provide an incentive for lower-
income households to relocate to low-cost regions. In particular, households may seek to move to 
a lower-cost area to realize a similar after-tax income but fewer hours devoted to work. Albouy 
(2008) explores similar incentives arising from federal income tax deductions and shows that the 
size of these distortions can be considerable. In future work, we plan to examine if the EITC 
induced low-skilled workers in high-cost areas to migrate to low-cost areas. 
If policymakers intend to alter the labor supply decisions of low-skilled women, these 
conclusions are cause for concern. The appropriate policy remedy, however, is not clear. The 
most obvious solution to the problem identified in this paper is to determine EITC eligibility and 
benefit levels based on “real” (cost-of-living adjusted) dollar amounts.  While straight-forward, 
this approach is not without problems. The EITC is already complicated to claim, which may 
contribute to errors in claiming the credit or reduced participation rates (Holtzblatt and 
McCubbin, 2004). Introducing regional differences in the federal credit could exacerbate these 
problems as well as stir-up political opposition among perceived “losers,” an unfortunate side-
effect for a program that has enjoyed considerable broad-based political support.  
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States could play an important role in addressing geographic imbalances. Although not 
very widespread during the period we study, state-level EITCs have become increasingly 
common.27 By 2007, twenty one states (including the District of Columbia) had adopted 
refundable EITCs to supplement the federal policy and three additional states had non-refundable 
state EITC policies (Levitis and Koulish, 2007). While some of the higher-cost states have 
adopted relatively generous credit programs – the state EITC is set at 30 percent of the federal 
benefit in New York and 35 percent in Washington, D.C. – in most, it remains a small share of 
the federal credit. Many high-cost states, including California, Connecticut, and Hawaii, lack 
refundable EITCs. Furthermore, no state has modified its credit to adjust for cost differences 
within a state, which can be substantial.  
Local EITCs represent another promising opportunity for addressing the issues associated 
with cost-of-living differences. While only a few localities have adopted supplemental EITC 
policies, they have been implemented in high-cost areas: New York City, San Francisco, and 
Montgomery County, MD (Holt, 2006). In two of these cases, the size of the local benefit is 
noteworthy; the local benefit in San Francisco is 16 percent of the federal credit, and in 
Montgomery County, MD it is 20 percent. The local credit in New York City, however, is set at 
only five percent of the federal EITC benefit. The merit of local EITCs is that they can provide a 
benefit that is more targeted to high-cost areas, but it is far from clear that local or regional 
governments have sufficient resources to fund EITC programs adequate to overcome the hurdles 
imposed by high cost-of-living.  
                                                 
27 In the mid-1990s only five states had refundable EITC policies in place: Maryland, Minnesota, New York, 
Vermont, and Wisconsin. Our analysis generally ignores these state policies, which were quite small at the time, and 
with many of the highest cost areas in California, Connecticut, Hawaii, New Jersey, and Massachusetts, the pattern 
of state EITCs shows little relationship to a state’s cost-of-living. By 2007, however, twenty states and the District 
of Columbia had adopted refundable EITCs to supplement the federal policy. Three additional states had EITC 
policies that were not refundable. 
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Further, insufficient purchasing power of the federal EITC benefit in high-cost areas is 
only part of the cost-of-living problem. Unless eligibility rules reflect local wage levels, fewer 
workers will be impacted in high-cost areas, workers will be treated differently by the policy 
depending on where they live, and incentives to relocate will remain.  
Section VI: Conclusion  
The federal EITC affects the labor decisions of the potentially eligible. We replicate the 
estimates in the literature of the intensive and extensive labor supply effects of the EITC using 
the 1993 expansion as a natural experiment. We contribute to the literature by taking into 
account local price differences. We find that the credit has differential effects across geographic 
areas, particularly for the participation decision. The effects of the EITC on labor market 
participation of single women are greatest in lower-cost areas. We demonstrate that estimates of 
the labor supply response to the EITC that do not account for the specific prices and local labor 
markets of potential beneficiaries will not fully capture the behavioral response. 
We suggest that the welfare gain from the 1993 expansion is distributed unevenly across 
metropolitan areas. In fact, metropolitan areas with the very highest costs may have experienced 
a welfare loss for each EITC dollar spent while low-cost areas overwhelmingly benefited from 
the credit. Improved policy targeting to populations that did not benefit from the 1993 expansion 
may be necessary to address geographic imbalances. 
 
 
 
APPENDIX A. Data Description 
 
MSAs over time in the CPS 
 
Cost-of-living and unemployment rates in this study are based on information in MSAs and non-
MSA areas. There is one non-MSA area for every state, except New Jersey. Any observations 
which do not report a basic geographic identifier (MSA or non-MSA) are dropped from the data.  
 
MSA definitions, which are based on at least 50,000 persons residing in a geographic area, were 
updated following the 1990 Census and implemented in the CPS in 1994. To link geographic 
units in 1994 and 1995 to the equivalent geographic units before 1994 requires constructing 
consistent geographic definitions over this period. The major changes to the MSA definitions 
include: 1) new Primary Metropolitan Statistical Areas (PMSAs) were created from several 
MSAs and tracking the separate MSAs that were discontinued: 2) collapsing of multiple adjacent 
MSAs into a single MSA; 3) creation of new MSAs out of previously non-MSA areas, and: 4) 
downgrading areas from MSA to non-MSA.  
 
To make the geography in the CPS consistent between 1990 and 1995 we had to make two basic 
changes. For previously distinct MSAs that were consolidated into PMSAs or larger MSAs, we 
applied the new consolidated definition on the early 1990s geography. Any MSAs that were 
created out of, or returned to, non-MSA regions were classified as non-MSA in all years.  
 
Also during this period there was a major sample redesign in the CPS. In addition to the adoption 
of the new MSA definitions, and changes to some of the basic questions, the CPS also changed 
its sample frame. Some MSAs were dropped from the survey, while others were added. Areas 
that were either added to or dropped from the survey are included in the non-MSA region; added 
regions are included in non-MSA in the mid-1990s, while dropped regions are included in non-
MSA in the early-1990s when they are still in the survey. 
 
Twenty-three MSAs are excluded in Chen and Rosenthal’s data, but are included in the CPS. 
These few MSAs are assigned the quality-adjusted rent measure of the closest substitute – based 
on geographic proximity, median household income, total population, unadjusted median home 
price, and unadjusted median rent from the 1990 Census. MSAs with missing values (and the 
‘donor’ MSA in parenthesis) include: Burlington, VT (from Manchester, NH); Charleston, WV 
(from Huntington-Ashland); Columbus, GA-AL (from Macon, GA); Evansville-Henderson, IN-
KY (from Louisville, KY); Fargo-Moorhead, ND-MN (from St. Cloud, MN); Fitchburg-
Leominster, MA (from Worcester, MA); Fort Smith AR-OK (from Fayetteville-Springdale, AR); 
Fort Walton Beach, FL (from Pensacola and Jacksonville, FL); Gadsden, AL (from Florence, 
AL); Huntsville, AL (from Decatur, AL); Lake Charles, LA (from Beaumont-Port-Arthur, TX); 
Laredo, TX (from McAllen-Edinburg-Pharr-Mission, TX); Lawton, TX (from Lubbock, TX); 
Naples, FL (from Palm Beach-Boca-Delray, FL); Panama City, FL (from Pensacola, FL); 
Portland, ME (from Manchester, NH); Portsmouth-Rochester, NH-ME (from Lawrence-Haverill 
MA/NH); Poughkeepsie/Dutchess, NY (from Orange, NY); Sioux City IA-NE (Waterloo-Cedar 
Falls, IA); Sioux Falls, SD (from Wichita, KS and Tulsa, OK); Tallahassee, FL (from Tampa-
St.Petersburg-Clearwater, FL); Topeka, KS (from Kansas City, MO-KS); Wheeling, WV-OH 
(from Pittsburgh-Beaver Valley, PA). 
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Appendix B: Distribution of Housing Cost Data 
    
 
 Quality-Adjusted Rental Costs 
HUD Fair Market 
Rent: 2 Bedroom 
Apartment 
Census Median 
Rent 
1st Decile 1,190 425 371 
2nd 1,656 449 401 
3rd 2,066 477 421 
4th 2,449 506 460 
5th 2,775 554 501 
6th 3,131 602 525 
7th 3,877 635 533 
8th 4,973 703 626 
9th 6,771 747 671 
10th 9,920 930 855 
    
Note: The first column provides the (positive) quality-adjusted rental measures in 1990 
from Chen and Rosenthal (2008). Chen and Rosenthal report quality adjusted rent in each 
MSA relative to the mean. To ensure all rental values are positive, we transform their 
data by adding $4,000 to each value. The middle column provides the 1990 HUD fair 
market rent values for each MSA. The HUD data provides the price for a two-bedroom 
unit from a series of separate regional surveys. The final column provides median rent 
data from the 1990 Census. The Census data includes all types of rental housing, 
regardless of the number of rooms. Thus, quality-adjusted rent best controls for the 
quality of the housing stocks by taking into account all housing characteristics. The 
Census data may introduce variation in the median rent arising from the mix of types 
within the rental market while the HUD data controls for the rental size and, to some 
extent, the quality of the rental housing stock. 
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Table 1. Average Hourly Wage for Specific Occupations and Industries by Rental Cost Decile (1990-93) 
                
    Occupations   Industries 
Decile of the 
Rent 
Distribution 
Quality-
Adjusted 
Rental Costs 
Cashier Secretary 
Nursing 
Aids, 
Orderlies, 
Attendants 
 
Eating & 
Drinking 
Places 
Hospitals 
Elementary 
& Secondary 
Schools 
1st $1,190 $4.47 $6.40 $5.51  $4.12 $9.09 $6.58 
                
2nd 1,656 4.82 7.02 5.59  4.25 9.89 6.65 
                
3rd 2,066 4.94 6.98 6.20  4.39 9.82 8.07 
                
4th 2,449 4.83 7.39 6.07  4.17 10.30 7.02 
                
5th 2,775 5.30 7.59 5.78  4.52 11.00 7.27 
                
6th 3,131 5.22 8.11 6.47  4.39 10.86 7.96 
                
7th 3,877 5.33 8.06 6.45  4.43 11.18 8.27 
                
8th 4,973 5.65 8.62 7.20  4.66 12.07 8.64 
                
9th 6,771 5.90 9.34 7.57  5.13 12.40 9.68 
                
10th 9,920 6.37 10.01 8.32  5.54 14.22 10.68 
                
Coefficient from regression of hourly wages on annual quality-adjusted rent 
 Occupations   Industries  
 
All Industries 
& 
Occupations Cashier Secretary  
Nursing 
Aids, 
Orderlies, 
Attendants 
 
Eating & 
Drinking 
Places  
Hospitals 
Elementary 
& Secondary 
Schools  
 0.00031*** .00031*** .00024*** .00042***  .00037*** .00019*** .00048*** 
 (.00002) (.00002) (.00004) (.00005)  (.00002) (.00003) (.00008) 
 
Note: The first column provides the (positive) quality-adjusted rental measures in 1990 from Chen and Rosenthal (2008). Chen and Rosenthal 
report quality adjusted rent in each MSA relative to the mean. To ensure all rental values are positive, we transform their data by adding $4,000 to 
each value.  Hourly wage, industry, and occupation data come from the 1990-1993 Current Population Survey (CPS) Outgoing Rotation Groups 
(ORG). Regression of hourly wages on monthly rent include controls for age, age squared, local unemployment rate, education, industry, Number 
of Dependents under age 5, number of dependents, welfare reform variables, year effects, and education by industry effects. All regressions are 
run separately by industry and occupation groups and weighted by the CPS-ORG household weight. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 2. Distribution of Employed Single Women, aged 18 to 49, across EITC Schedule (1990-1993) 
 Rental Cost Distribution 
 All Areas Bottom Quarter Second Quarter Third Quarter Top Quarter 
Panel A. All Education Levels 
Phase-in 33.7% 45.0% 36.1% 32.5% 29.0% 
Plateau 13.9% 16.8% 16.3% 13.1% 12.4% 
Phase-out 26.8% 25.6% 27.1% 28.0% 26.6% 
Off Schedule 25.6% 12.6% 20.4% 26.4% 32.1% 
      
Panel B. High School Degree or Less 
Phase-in 39.7% 49.0% 41.9% 38.1% 34.9% 
Plateau 17.1% 18.9% 19.3% 16.2% 15.9% 
Phase-out 29.2% 25.8% 27.0% 30.6% 31.0% 
Off Schedule 14.0% 6.3% 11.7% 15.2% 18.3% 
      
Note: Data from the 1990-1993 March Current Population Survey (CPS) which, in addition to the demographic and labor market 
information provided in the regular monthly survey, provides additional information on prior year income and labor supply. We 
assign single females to each region of the schedule based on this prior year income and demographic characteristics. We include 
only those females who report working non-zero hours in the current year and in the prior year. The metropolitan area costs are 
based on the distribution of (positive) quality-adjusted rental measures in 1990 from Chen and Rosenthal (2008).  
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Table 3: EITC Parameters before and after Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) 1993 
  Income Amounts for Plateau Region 
  
Phase-In 
Region Credit 
Rate 
Phase-Out 
Region Credit 
Rate Begin Plateau End Plateau 
Ending 
Income 
Maximum 
benefit 
Workers Without Children 
  
1990 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1991 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1992 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1993 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1994 7.65 -7.65 4,000 5,000 9,000 306 
1995 7.65 -7.65 4,100 5,130 9,230 314 
1996 7.65 -7.65 4,220 5,280 9,500 323 
Workers with 1 Child 
  
1990 14 -10 6,810 10,730 20,264 953 
1991 16.7 -11.93 7,140 11,250 21,250 1,192 
1992 17.6 -12.57 7,520 11,840 22,370 1,324 
1993 18.5 -13.21 7,750 12,200 23,050 1,434 
1994 26.3 -15.98 7,750 11,000 23,755 2,038 
1995 34 -15.98 6,160 11,290 24,396 2,094 
1996 34 -15.98 6,330 11,610 25,078 2,152 
Workers with 2 or more Children 
  
1990 14 -10 6,810 10,730 20,264 953 
1991 17.3 -12.36 7,140 11,250 21,250 1,235 
1992 18.4 -13.14 7,520 11,840 22,370 1,384 
1993 19.5 -13.93 7,750 12,200 23,050 1,511 
1994 30 -17.68 8,425 11,000 25,296 2,528 
1995 36 -20.22 8,640 11,290 26,673 3,110 
1996 40 -21.06 8,890 11,610 28,495 3,556 
       
Source: Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center. Dollar amounts unadjusted for inflation. 
Table 4: Summary Statistics for Low-Educated, Single Women (Weighted) 
     By Rental Cost Distribution  
 
All Single 
Women 
With 
Dependents 
Without 
Dependents  
Lowest 
Quarter  
Second 
Quarter  
Third 
Quarter  
Highest 
Quarter 
Age 31.276 31.575 31.056  31.602  30.901  31.332  31.184 
 (9.568) (7.994) (10.573)  (9.628)  (9.563)  (0.962)  (9.492) 
Less than High School 0.318  0.365  0.282   0.325   0.313   0.290   0.336  
 (0.466) (0.482) (0.450)  (0.469)  (0.464)  (0.454)  (0.472) 
High School Graduate 0.682  0.635  0.718   0.675   0.687   0.710   0.664  
 (0.466) (0.482) (0.450)  (0.469)  (0.464)  (0.454)  (0.472) 
Nonwhite 0.307 0.392 0.245  0.267  0.296  0.344  0.305 
 (0.461) (0.488) (0.430)  (0.442)  (0.456)  (0.475)  (0.460) 
Preschool Children 0.301 0.710 -  0.269  0.293  0.310  0.315 
 (0.647) (0.834)   (0.600)  (0.660)  (0.651)  (0.662) 
Number of Dependents 0.779 1.836 -  0.805  0.777  0.777  0.766 
 (1.134) (1.045)   (1.124)  (1.107)  (1.126)  (1.155) 
AFDC Waivers 0.311 0.301 0.318  0.237  0.118  0.213  0.495 
 (0.463) (0.459) (0.466)  (0.425)  (0.323)  (0.410)  (0.500) 
MSA Unemployment Rate 0.059 0.060 0.058  0.061  0.054  0.048  0.068 
 (0.022) (0.023) (0.021)  (0.020)  (0.021)  (0.016)  (0.022) 
(Positive) Quality-Adjusted Rental Costs 4,175.05  4,068.14  4,253.78   1,259.13   2,379.26   3,496.50   6,938.16  
 (2496.40) (2436.09) (2537.05)  (409.84)  (242.78)  (517.79)  (1591.30) 
Labor Force Participation 0.599 0.512 0.662  0.601  0.626  0.628  0.565 
 (0.490) (0.500) (0.473)  (0.490)  (0.484)  (0.483)  (0.496) 
Observations 59,708 24,973 34,735  13,347  7,213  15,406  23,742 
Number of Dependents for Mothers 1.836 1.836 -  1.811  1.809  1.826  1.870 
 (1.045) (1.045)   (1.011)  (0.994)  (1.032)  (1.092) 
Observations 24,973 24,973   5,860  3,029  6,516  9,568 
Hours Worked Last Week, if Working 36.828 36.628 36.941  36.806  36.388  37.472  36.460 
 (11.352) (11.525) (11.251)  (11.816)  (11.048)  (11.625)  (10.921) 
Observations 36,877 12,770 24,107  8,134  4,793  10,011  13,939 
Hourly Earnings, if Working and Paid 6.938  6.998  6.850   5.992  6.448   6.964   7.756  
 (3.108) (3.044) (3.131)  (2.368)  (2.806)  (3.122)  (3.420) 
Observations 17,010 5,965 11,045  3,996   2,325  4,822  5,867 
Weekly Earnings, if Working 302.509 303.505 301.940  264.351  276.348  302.668  335.005 
 (190.155) (195.250) (187.180)  (170.900)  (165.761)  (172.850)  (2.165) 
Observations 35,595 12,335 23,260  7,823   4,631  9,691  13,450 
Note: Authors' calculations based on the 1990-1995 monthly Current Population Survey (CPS). All summary statistics are weighted by the CPS household weight. Single women are considered 
low-educated if they have a high school degree or less. (Positive) quality-adjusted rental cost data are 1990 measures from Chen and Rosenthal (2008). Chen and Rosenthal report quality adjusted 
rent in each MSA relative to the mean. To ensure all rental values are positive, we transform their data by adding $4,000 to each value. 
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Table 5. Mean Marginal Effects from Probit Estimates on Labor Force Participation 
 Low-educated women  All Women   
 (1)  (2)   (3)    (4)  (5)  (6)  
Treatment 0.035  0.037  0.036    0.015  0.018  0.017  
 (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.024)   (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.017)  
Post -0.080 *** -0.079 *** -0.081 ***  -0.060 *** -0.057 *** -0.060 *** 
 (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.02106)   (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  
Treatment*Post 0.047 *** 0.073 *** 0.102  ***  0.031 *** 0.043 *** 0.063 *** 
 (0.010)  (0.018)  (0.015)   (0.006)  (0.011)  (0.010)  
  0.023       0.028    Treatment*Post    
*2nd Cost Qtr   (0.027)       (0.018)    
  -0.015       -0.009    Treatment*Post 
*3rd Cost Qtr   (0.026)       (0.017)    
  -0.076 ***      -0.041 ***   Treatment*Post 
*4th Cost Qtr   (0.023)       (0.016)    
    -0.00001 ***      -0.00001 *** Treatment*Post 
*Rental Costs     (0.000)       (0.00000)  
High School 
Graduate 0.243 *** 0.242 *** 0.242  *** 
 
0.177 *** 0.177 *** 0.176 *** 
 (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)   (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  
Some College        0.237 *** 0.237 *** 0.237  *** 
        (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  
College Degree        0.264 *** 0.263 *** 0.263  *** 
        (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  
Beyond College        0.241 *** 0.240 *** 0.240  *** 
        (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  
Nonwhite -0.117 *** -0.118 *** -0.118 ***  -0.079 *** -0.080 *** -0.079 *** 
 (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)   (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  
Age 0.024 *** 0.024 *** 0.024  ***  0.016 *** 0.016 *** 0.016  *** 
 (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)   (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  
Age Squared -0.000 *** -0.000 *** 0.000 ***  -0.000 *** -0.000 *** 0.000 *** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
-0.114 *** -0.116 *** -0.11407 ***  -0.069 *** -0.070 *** -0.069 *** Number of 
Dependents (0.029)  (0.030)  (0.029)   (0.022)  (0.023)  (0.022)  
0.012 *** 0.012 *** 0.012  ***  0.007 ** 0.007 ** 0.007  ** Dependents 
Squared (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)   (0.003)  (0.003  (0.003)  
-0.088  -0.087  -0.08583   -0.082  -0.082  -0.081  Preschool Children 
(0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009)   (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  
Second Child 0.033  0.034  0.032    0.011  0.012  0.010   
 (0.027)  (0.028)  (0.028)   (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.019)  
Unemployment 
Rate -1.774 *** -1.672 *** -1.761 *** 
 
-1.322 *** -1.197 *** -1.321 *** 
 (0.262)  (0.275)  (0.261)   (0.156)  (0.168)  (0.156)  
AFDC Waiver -0.001 *** -0.001 *** -0.001 ***  0.007 *** 0.006 *** 0.007  *** 
 (0.016)  (0.015)  (0.01529)   (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009)  
Rental Costs -0.000    0.000    -0.000 **   -0.00000  
 (0.000)    (0.000)   (0.000)    (0.00000)  
Second Cost 
Quarter   0.009    
 
  -0.000    
   (0.020)       (0.014)    
Third Cost Quarter   0.015       0.018    
   (0.018)       (0.011)    
Fourth Cost 
Quarter   0.020    
 
  0.002    
   (0.020)       (0.012)    
Time Trend? Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 59,708  59,708  59,708   121,434  121,434  121,434  
              
Note: Data are from the 1990-1995 monthly surveys of the Current Population Survey (CPS). The dependent variable is labor force participation. Rental cost data is 
the (positive) quality-adjusted rental measures in 1990 from Chen and Rosenthal (2008). Chen and Rosenthal report quality adjusted rent in each MSA relative to the 
mean. To ensure all rental values are positive, we transform their data by adding $4,000 to each value. Reported coefficient estimates represent the mean marginal 
effects. All regressions are weighted with CPS household weight. Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: * 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 6. Mean Marginal Effects from Probit Estimates on Labor Force Participation, by Cost of Living 
 Low-educated, Single Women  All Single Women  
 By Rental Cost Distribution Percentiles  By Rental Cost Distribution Percentiles 
 0-25th 25th-50th 50th-75th 75th-87th Above 87th  0-25th 25th-50th 50th-75th 75th-87th Above 87th 
 (1)  (2)   (3)  (4)  (5)   (6)  (7)   (8)  (9)   (10)  
Treatment 0.097  0.057  -0.006  0.160 *** -0.075   -0.010  0.049  0.013  0.065  -0.037  
 (0.066)  (0.086)  (0.037)  (0.051)  (0.054)   (0.057)  (0.050)  (0.025)  (0.047)  (0.037)  
Post -0.056  -0.224 *** -0.080 ** -0.052  -0.019   -0.067 ** -0.147 *** -0.051 * -0.075 *** -0.001  
 (0.040)  (0.060)  (0.040)  (0.036)  (0.060)   (0.027)  (0.035)  (0.026)  (0.025)  (0.026)  
Treatment*Post 0.047 ** 0.063 *** 0.070 *** 0.008  0.035   0.030 ** 0.059 *** 0.036 *** 0.031 ** 0.011  
 (0.020)  (0.024)  (0.017)  (0.021)  (0.028)   (0.012)  (0.015)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.016)  
0.293 *** 0.247 *** 0.224 *** 0.288 *** 0.174 ***  0.227 *** 0.178 *** 0.154 *** 0.203 *** 0.137 *** High School 
Graduate (0.024)  (0.023)  (0.028)  (0.031)  (0.021)   (0.017)  (0.014)  (0.017)  (0.019)  (0.014)  
Some College            0.272 *** 0.224 *** 0.225 *** 0.260 *** 0.201 *** 
            (0.018)  (0.019)  (0.014)  (0.021)  (0.013)  
College Degree            0.288 *** 0.221 *** 0.244 *** 0.277 *** 0.260 *** 
            (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.012)  (0.018)  (0.017)  
           0.258 *** 0.224 *** 0.230 *** 0.245 *** 0.228 *** Beyond 
College            (0.017)  (0.015)  (0.010)  (0.012)  (0.017)  
Nonwhite -0.102 *** -0.105 *** -0.140 *** -0.138 *** -0.081 ***  -0.086 *** -0.081 *** -0.087 *** -0.087 *** -0.054 *** 
 (0.031)  (0.030)  (0.023)  (0.028)  (0.027)   (0.024)  (0.021)  (0.015)  (0.018)  (0.016)  
Age 0.021 *** 0.026 *** 0.015 ** 0.013 * 0.047 ***  0.013 * 0.018 *** 0.012 ** 0.012 ** 0.027 *** 
 (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.008)   (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.005)  
Age Squared -0.000 ** -0.000 ** -0.000 * -0.000  -0.001 ***  -0.000 * -0.000 ** -0.000 ** -0.000 * -0.000 *** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
-0.181 ** -0.101  -0.049  -0.297 *** -0.024   -0.047  -0.081  -0.051 * -0.158 ** -0.015  Number of 
Dependents (0.076)  (0.106)  (0.040)  (0.075)  (0.086)   (0.066)  (0.065)  (0.030)  (0.069)  (0.055)  
0.019  0.012  0.006  0.034 *** -0.004   0.004  0.010  0.006 * 0.017  -0.003  Dependents 
Squared (0.012)  (0.015)  (0.004)  (0.010)  (0.011)   (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.004)  (0.011)  (0.008)  
-0.050  -0.098  -0.100  -0.061  -0.118   -0.057  -0.084  -0.081  -0.071  -0.115  Preschool 
Children (0.018)  (0.026)  (0.018)  (0.019)  (0.020)   (0.017)  (0.019)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.016)  
Second Child 0.096 ** 0.008  -0.019  0.150 *** -0.029   0.011  -0.015  -0.005  0.077 * -0.015  
 (0.049)  (0.083)  (0.050)  (0.057)  (0.089)   (0.044)  (0.056)  (0.030)  (0.043)  (0.049)  
-1.227 ** -2.221 *** -1.605 *** -1.401 *** -2.862 ***  -1.337 *** -1.793 *** -1.318 *** -0.840 *** -1.489 ** Unemployment 
Rate (0.600)  (0.645)  (0.491)  (0.317)  (0.874)   (0.297)  (0.358)  (0.344)  (0.202)  (0.595)  
AFDC Waiver 0.024 *** -0.002 *** -0.061 *** 0.017 *** 0.032 ***  0.024 *** 0.012 *** -0.014 *** -0.002 *** 0.019 *** 
 (0.023)  (0.039)  (0.013)  (0.020)  (0.035)   (0.015)  (0.025)  (0.010)  (0.014)  (0.021)  
Time Trend? Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 13,236  7,077  14,868  10,538  13,989   22,539  14,099  31,014  22,367  31,415  
Note: Data are from the 1990-1995 monthly surveys of the Current Population Survey (CPS). The dependent variable is labor force participation. Rental cost data is the (positive) quality-adjusted rental measures 
in 1990 from Chen and Rosenthal (2008). Chen and Rosenthal report quality adjusted rent in each MSA relative to the mean. To ensure all rental values are positive, we transform their data by adding $4,000 to 
each value. Reported coefficient estimates represent the mean marginal effects. All regressions are weighted with CPS household weight. Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Statistical significance is 
denoted as follows: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 7. Mean Marginal Effects from "Placebo" Regressions on Labor Force Participation 
          
 Low-Educated Women 
 1990 to 1991  1993 to 1994 
 (1)  (2)    (3)  (4)  
Treatment 0.028   0.029    0.023   0.025   
 (0.020)   (0.020)    (0.059)   (0.059)   
Post 0.011   0.009    -0.052 ***  -0.051 ***  
 (0.008)   (0.008)    (0.011)   (0.011)   
Treatment*Post -0.015   -0.020    0.031 **  0.044 **  
 (0.012)   (0.018)    (0.014)   (0.021)   
   0.016       0.061 *  Treatment*Post 
*2nd Quarter    (0.025)       (0.033)   
   0.025       -0.015   Treatment*Post 
*3rd Quarter    (0.020)       (0.032)   
   -0.016       -0.049 *  Treatment*Post* 
4th Quarter    (0.020)       (0.027)   
High School 
Graduate 0.235 ***  0.235 ***  
 
0.257 ***  0.256 ***  
 (0.011)   (0.011)    (0.017)   (0.017)   
Nonwhite -0.126 ***  -0.126 ***   -0.108 ***  -0.109 ***  
 (0.014)   (0.014)    (0.016)   (0.016)   
Age 0.032 ***  0.032 ***   0.025 ***  0.024 ***  
 (0.003)   (0.003)    (0.005)   (0.006)   
Age Squared -0.000 ***  -0.000 ***   -0.000 ***  -0.000 ***  
 (0.000)   (0.000)    (0.000)   (0.000)   
Number of 
Dependents -0.096 ***  -0.097 ***  
 
-0.086   -0.088   
 (0.022)   (0.023)    (0.073)   (0.074)   
Dependents 
Squared 0.009 ***  0.009 ***  
 
0.008   0.008   
 (0.003)   (0.003)    (0.011)   (0.012)   
-0.119 ***  -0.120 ***   -0.080 ***  -0.079 ***  Preschool 
Children (0.007)   (0.007)    (0.012)   (0.012)   
Second Child 0.032 *  0.033 *   0.014   0.014   
 (0.018)   (0.018)    (0.052)   (0.052)   
Unemployment 
Rate -3.079 ***  -2.796 ***  
 
-4.068 ***  -4.024 ***  
 (0.545)   (0.572)    (1.005)   (1.012)   
AFDC Waiver        0.002   0.002   
        (0.016)   (0.015)   
Rental Costs -0.000 *      0.000      
 (0.000)       (0.000)      
Second Cost 
Quarter    0.010   
 
   -0.039   
    (0.017)       (0.026)   
Third Cost 
Quarter    -0.001   
 
   0.007   
    (0.015)       (0.023)   
Fourth Cost 
Quarter    -0.015   
 
   0.018   
    (0.016)       (0.022)   
Month Effects? Yes   Yes    Yes   Yes   
Obs.  25,762   25,762    23,401   23,401   
              
Note: Data are from the 1990, 1991, 1993, and 1994 monthly surveys of the Current Population Survey (CPS). The dependent variable is labor force 
participation. Rental cost data is the (positive) quality-adjusted rental measures in 1990 from Chen and Rosenthal (2008). Chen and Rosenthal report quality 
adjusted rent in each MSA relative to the mean. To ensure all rental values are positive, we transform their data by adding $4,000 to each value. Reported 
coefficient estimates represent the mean marginal effects. All regressions are weighted with CPS household weight. Clustered standard errors are in 
parentheses. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 8: Difference-in-Difference Estimates on Hours worked per Week for Single Women, Conditional on Working 
 Low-educated women  All Women 
 (1)  (2)  (3)   (4)  (5)  (6)  
Treatment -0.368   -0.323   -0.327    -0.189  -0.182  -0.219  
 (0.872)  (0.874)  (0.880)   (0.615)  (0.617)  (0.613)  
Post -0.777  -0.760  -0.775   -0.071  -0.007  -0.050  
 (0.687)  (0.686)  (0.687)   (0.464)  (0.456)  (0.462)  
0.359  1.254 ** 1.726 ***  0.317  0.688 * 0.215  Treatment*Post 
(0.379)  (0.600)  (0.630)   (0.243)  (0.369)  (0.408)  
  -1.121       -1.476 **   Treatment*Post 
*2nd Quarter   (0.956)       (0.701)    
  -0.406       -0.288    Treatment*Post 
*3rd Quarter   (0.864)       (0.562)    
  -1.900 **      -0.214    Treatment*Post* 
4th Quarter   (0.832)       (0.509)    
    -.00035 **      0.000  Treatment*Post* 
Rental Costs     (.00015)       (0.000)  
2.306 *** 2.297 *** 2.279 ***  2.302 *** 2.312 *** 2.292 *** High School 
Graduate (0.343)  (0.341)  (0.340)   (0.337)  (0.339)  (0.339)  
Some College        2.989 *** 2.970 *** 2.981 *** 
        (0.357)  (0.357)  (0.359)  
College Degree        4.844 *** 4.833  4.857  
        (0.397)  (0.398)  (0.398)  
Beyond College        6.465 *** 6.464 *** 6.489 *** 
        (0.510)  (0.513)  (0.513)  
Nonwhite -0.330  -0.344  -0.344   -0.331  -0.347  -0.320  
 (0.335)  (0.332)  (0.336)   (0.229)  (0.229)  (0.229)  
Age 1.102 *** 1.097 *** 1.091 ***  1.083 *** 1.086 *** 1.088 *** 
 (0.131)  (0.130)  (0.131)   (0.102)  (0.102)  (0.102)  
Age Squared -0.014 *** -0.014 *** -0.014 ***  -0.014 *** -0.014 *** -0.014 *** 
 (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)   (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  
-0.415  -0.408  -0.407   -0.743  -0.741  -0.737  Number of 
Dependents (0.981)  (0.986)  (0.986)   (0.702)  (0.704)  (0.700)  
0.009  0.007  0.008   0.021  0.021  0.020  Dependents 
Squared (0.123)  (0.125)  (0.123)   (0.098)  (0.099)  (0.098)  
-0.120  -0.123  -0.112   -0.255  -0.267  -0.256  Preschool 
Children (0.319)  (0.322)  (0.319)   (0.237)  (0.239)  (0.239)  
Second Child -1.032  -1.070  -1.079   -0.336  -0.347  -0.344  
 (1.016)  (1.016)  (1.018)   (0.645)  (0.644)  (0.645)  
-36.560 *** -34.12 *** -35.88 ***  -32.38 *** -27.64 *** -30.49 *** Unemployment 
Rate (7.968)  (9.246)  (8.177)   (5.672)  (6.697)  (5.893)  
AFDC Waiver -0.090  -0.113  -0.045   -0.304  -0.282  -0.197  
 (0.327)  (0.350)  (0.340)   (0.268)  (0.283)  (0.274)  
Rental Costs -0.003    0.000   -0.007 *   -0.000 *** 
 (0.005)    (0.000)   (0.004)    (0.000)  
2nd Cost Qtr   -0.225       0.105    
   (0.664)       (0.477)    
3rd Cost Qtr   0.357       0.308    
   (0.514)       (0.381)    
4th Cost Qtr   0.412       -0.490    
   (0.527)       (0.398)    
19.047 *** 18.521 *** 18.736 ***  19.706 *** 18.942 *** 19.647 *** Constant 
(2.157)  (2.123)  (2.171)   (1.673)  (1.658)  (1.660)  
Time Trend? Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 36,877  36,877  36,877   88,440  88,440  88,440  
Note: Data are from the 1990-1995 monthly surveys of the Current Population Survey (CPS). The dependent variable is hours worked 
last week. Rental cost data is the (positive) quality-adjusted rental measures in 1990 from Chen and Rosenthal (2008). All regressions 
are weighted with CPS household weight. Clustered standard errors are in parentheses.  
Table 9: Difference-in-Difference Estimates on Hours worked per Week for Single Women, Conditional on Working, by Cost of Living 
 Low-educated, Single Women  All Single Women 
 By Rental Cost Distribution Percentiles  By Rental Cost Distribution Percentiles   
 0-25th 25th-50th 50th-75th  75th-87th Above 87th  0-25th 25th-50th 50th-75th 75th-87th  Above 87th 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)   (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  
Treatment -1.928  -2.745  -0.365  3.592 * 1.724   0.156  -0.645  -1.511  3.116 *** 0.937  
 (3.530)  (3.112)  (1.267)  (2.107)  (1.577)   (2.033)  (1.701)  (0.955)  (1.153)  (1.537)  
Post 1.502  -1.375  -0.176  -5.186 ** -0.149   1.618  0.249  1.080  -2.044 * -1.308  
 (1.316)  (1.526)  (1.381)  (2.052)  (1.246)   (1.257)  (1.120)  (0.865)  (1.111)  (0.916)  
0.910  0.507  1.344 * -0.131  -1.751 *  0.641  -0.920  0.681  0.061  0.222  Treatment*Post 
(0.668)  (1.021)  (0.676)  (0.843)  (1.035)   (0.387)  (0.750)  (0.455)  (0.482)  (0.676)  
2.645 *** 3.698 *** 2.920 *** 1.351 * 0.957   2.556 *** 3.794 *** 3.000 *** 1.360 * 1.106  High School 
Graduate (0.727)  (0.760)  (0.664)  (0.780)  (0.812)   (0.723)  (0.766)  (0.667)  (0.774)  (0.860)  
Some College            3.229 *** 4.278 *** 3.516 *** 2.785 *** 1.421 * 
            (0.662)  (0.879)  (0.667)  (0.864)  (0.743)  
           5.860 *** 5.882 *** 5.770 *** 3.457 *** 3.509 *** College Degree 
           (0.862)  (1.010)  (0.698)  (1.081)  (0.896)  
           6.964 *** 10.199 *** 6.172 *** 6.807 *** 4.752 *** Beyond 
College            (0.918)  (1.697)  (0.987)  (0.865)  (0.935)  
Nonwhite -0.570  -1.990 *** -0.056  0.029  0.270   0.048  -1.081  -0.374  0.077  -0.229  
 (0.754)  (0.725)  (0.687)  (0.790)  (0.656)   (0.590)  (0.663)  (0.472)  (0.463)  (0.440)  
Age 0.950 *** 1.146 *** 1.060 *** 1.464 *** 1.046 ***  1.184 *** 1.378 *** 0.914 *** 1.416 *** 0.854 *** 
 (0.295)  (0.300)  (0.236)  (0.336)  (0.271)   (0.221)  (0.231)  (0.191)  (0.236)  (0.209)  
Age Squared -0.011 ** -0.015 *** -0.013 *** -0.019 *** -0.013 ***  -0.015 *** -0.018 *** -0.011 *** -0.019 *** -0.010 *** 
 (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.005)  (0.004)   (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  
1.012  1.308  0.180  -5.020 ** -2.580   -1.615  -0.971  1.114  -4.060 *** -2.187  Number of 
Dependents (3.832)  (3.805)  (1.534)  (2.315)  (1.917)   (2.094)  (2.215)  (1.068)  (1.241)  (1.986)  
-0.358  -0.140  -0.074  0.572 ** 0.768 **  -0.029  0.278  -0.182 * 0.479 *** 0.312  Dependents 
Squared (0.526)  (0.509)  (0.116)  (0.218)  (0.358)   (0.297)  (0.333)  (0.094)  (0.175)  (0.397)  
0.127  0.713  -0.280  -0.235  -0.909   0.072  0.606  -0.272  -0.931 ** -0.841  Preschool 
Children (0.662)  (0.866)  (0.716)  (0.658)  (0.628)   (0.460)  (0.650)  (0.506)  (0.417)  (0.702)  
Second Child 0.824  -1.663  -2.994  2.094  -2.527   1.927  -0.788  -2.549 ** 1.504  0.419  
 (2.433)  (3.046)  (2.121)  (2.724)  (1.717)   (1.343)  (2.084)  (1.164)  (1.305)  (1.172)  
-16.320  -56.280 * -66.966 *** -23.960  -29.162   -22.393 * -28.169  -44.084 *** -24.016 ** -29.691 * Unemployment 
Rate (13.987)  (31.613)  (17.007)  (16.810)  (23.261)   (11.888)  (18.010)  (14.389)  (11.543)  (17.520)  
AFDC Waiver 0.272  0.073  -0.485  0.110  -0.178   -0.112  -0.015  -0.878 ** -0.247  0.118  
 (0.653)  (1.862)  (0.404)  (0.730)  (0.563)   (0.539)  (0.903)  (0.404)  (0.679)  (0.448)  
Constant 21.232 *** 18.305 *** 22.408 *** 8.283 * 20.101 ***  18.066 *** 12.796 *** 23.809 *** 11.779 *** 22.350 *** 
 (5.355)  (5.213)  (3.806)  (4.430)  (3.747)   (3.807)  (4.150)  (2.996)  (2.958)  (3.594)  
Time Trend? Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Obs. 8068  4704  9660  6418  8027   15614  10632  23481  16285  22428  
R2 0.04  0.07  0.06  0.07  0.05   0.06  0.08  0.05  0.07  0.05  
                      
Note: Data are from the 1990-1995 monthly surveys of the Current Population Survey (CPS). The dependent variable is hours worked last week. Rental cost data is the (positive) quality-adjusted rental 
measures in 1990 from Chen and Rosenthal (2008), who report quality adjusted rent in each MSA relative to the mean. To ensure all rental values are positive, we transform their data by adding $4,000 to each 
value. All regressions are weighted with CPS household weight. Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. 
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Table 10: Estimates from Heckman Models of Hours Worked Last Week for Low-educated Women 
  By Rental Cost Distribution Percentiles  
 All Areas  0-25th  25th-50th  50th-75th  75th-87th  Above 87th  
 (1)  (2)  (3)   (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)   
Treatment -1.053 *** -1.061 *** -1.061 ***  -0.599 * -1.766 ** -1.097 *** -0.645  -1.372 *** 
 (0.193)  (0.193)  (0.194)   (0.312)  (0.711)  (0.350)  (0.462)  (0.416)  
Post -0.747 *** -0.737 *** -0.752 ***  -0.581  -1.028  -0.688  -1.152 ** -0.406  
 (0.247)  (0.246)  (0.246)   (0.514)  (0.732)  (0.494)  (0.466)  (0.537)  
-0.171  0.203  0.279    -0.213  0.305  0.303  -0.448  -0.837  Treatment*Post 
 (0.282)  (0.397)  (0.404)   (0.486)  (0.813)  (0.492)  (0.642)  (0.732)  
  -0.486               Treatment*Post*2nd 
Quarter   (0.601)               
  -0.136               Treatment*Post*3rd 
Quarter   (0.542)               
  -0.796 *              Treatment*Post*4th 
Quarter   (0.454)               
    0.000             Treatment*Post*Rental 
Costs     (0.000)             
-0.318 * -0.342 ** -0.323 *  -0.307  -0.038  -0.036  -0.742 * -0.516  Preschool Children 
(0.173)  (0.173)  (0.172)   (0.348)  (0.678)  (0.266)  (0.428)  (0.414)  
Age 1.062 *** 1.066 *** 1.062  ***  1.031 *** 1.251 *** 1.024 *** 0.887 *** 1.100 *** 
 (0.054)  (0.055)  (0.055)   (0.132)  (0.149)  (0.108)  (0.111)  (0.100)  
-0.013 *** -0.013 *** -0.013 ***  -0.013 *** -0.016 *** -0.013 *** -0.011 *** -0.014 *** Age Squared 
(0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)   (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.001)  
2.289 *** 2.319 *** 2.295  ***  2.261 *** 2.009 *** 3.141 *** 1.997 *** 1.751 *** High School Grad 
(0.220)  (0.219)  (0.217)   (0.471)  (0.540)  (0.407)  (0.592)  (0.404)  
Nonwhite -0.759 *** -0.769 *** -0.748 ***  -0.699 * -2.040 *** -0.914 *** -0.764 * 0.082  
 (0.163)  (0.164)  (0.164)   (0.378)  (0.494)  (0.231)  (0.459)  (0.322)  
-25.44 *** -23.87 *** -25.72 ***  -20.30 *** -37.49 *** -29.92 *** -16.88 ** -21.88 ** Unemployment Rate 
(3.43)  (3.82)  (3.55)   (6.22)  (11.97)  (11.47)  (7.34)  (8.56)  
0.007 **      -0.017  -0.037  0.033  -0.036  -0.020  Rent Percentile 
(0.003)       (0.024)  (0.040)  (0.026)  (0.046)  (0.048)  
-0.011  0.008  0.021    0.408  -0.514  0.023  -0.069  0.262  AFDC Waiver 
(0.199)  (0.215)  (0.207)   (0.479)  (0.611)  (0.303)  (0.557)  (0.353)  
  0.035               Second Cost Quarter 
  (0.349)               
  0.769 ***              Third Cost Quarter 
  (0.250)               
  0.592 **              Fourth Cost Quarter 
  (0.250)               
Rental Costs     0.000  *            
     (0.000)             
Constant 18.378 *** 18.080 *** 18.515  ***  18.518 *** 17.875 *** 17.506 *** 24.427 *** 19.854 *** 
 (0.973)  (0.998)  (0.963)   (2.120)  (2.834)  (2.444)  (4.827)  (5.058)  
Time Trend Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Obs. 59,708  59,708  59,708   13,236  7,077  14,868  10,538  13,989  
Note: Data are from the 1990-1995 monthly surveys of the Current Population Survey (CPS). Results are from the second stage of the Heckman Model. Variables excluded from the second stage of the 
Heckman Model include Number of Dependents under 18, the Number of Dependents squared, and an indicator variable for the second child. The dependent variable is hours worked last week. Rental 
cost data is the (positive) quality-adjusted rental measures in 1990 from Chen and Rosenthal (2008). All regressions are weighted with CPS household weight. Clustered standard errors are in 
parentheses.  
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